The Post-Grant Strategist

In the wake of SAS Institute v. Iancu, the PTAB has sometimes expanded pending IPRs to include previously un-instituted grounds. But can the PTAB rely on SAS to retroactively deny institution? A recent decision says yes, in at least some circumstances. And while the facts of this case are unusual, it nevertheless demonstrates that petitioners should be cautious when relying on SAS to try to induce the PTAB to reconsider grounds that it didn’t originally find persuasive.

This past year, the Supreme Court in SAS Institute v. Iancu held that once the PTAB institutes an IPR trial its subsequent final written decision must address all claims challenged in the petition. The Court explained that its holding was compelled by a plain reading of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), which states that the PTAB must issue a final written decision on “any patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” SAS Institute did not decide, however, whether the PTAB’s final written decisions must also address all grounds raised in a petition. The Federal Circuit has subsequently provided a clearer answer.

One strategy that a patent owner can pursue in an IPR trial is to file a motion to amend seeking to replace one or more of the challenged claims with substitute claims that neither enlarge the scope of the claims nor introduce new subject matter. When a patent owner files such a motion, the petitioner is permitted to oppose the motion and argue why the substitute claims are not patentable. In a recent decision, the Board reaffirmed that the grounds available for a petitioner to attack the patentability of substitute claims are not limited to anticipation or obviousness, but rather can include other sections under the Patent Statute, including § 101.

Section 311(b) of the American Invents Act (“AIA”) provides that a petitioner may request cancellation of one or more claims of a patent “only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 and 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” In light of this clear restriction on the evidence that can lead to the cancellation of a claim, one might reasonably assume that all of the petitioner’s evidence during that trial must be prior art. A recent decision from the Federal Circuit, however, shows that this assumption is not entirely correct. Rather, in some situations, the cancellation of a claim may turn on evidence that is not even prior art to the claim.

A hallmark of IPR proceedings is that the petitioner—not the patent owner—has the burden to prove that the challenged claims are unpatentable. This hallmark is statutory as section 316(e) of the American Invents Act (which created IPRs) provides that “the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability.” And yet, a recent decision from the Federal Circuit confirms IPR nonetheless applies the traditional rule that can shift a burden to the patent owner to rebut the petitioner’s prima facie case of obviousness. Patent owners thus cannot blindly rely upon section 316(e) and, in certain circumstances, should consider submitting evidence to defend the claims.

As we have previously discussed, some petitioners for IPR are not able to appeal an adverse decision by the PTAB because they lack constitutional standing. Though Article III standing is not required to file an IPR petition, because it does not apply to administrative proceedings, standing is required to bring a case in Federal court—including an appeal to the Federal Circuit. Several recent decisions have further clarified this standing requirement and give good reason to continue to follow the issue.

Typically, the PTAB and district courts apply different claim construction standards, which can cause the two forums to construe the same term from the same patent differently. Such divergent treatment occurred in a recent PTAB decision, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Janssen Oncology, Inc. (IPR2016-01332). In Mylan, the PTAB’s claim interpretation of the term “treatment” differed from the district court’s interpretation of the same term in co-pending litigation. The Mylan decision illustrates the divide between the two forums’ claim construction standards and the consequences that those different standards can have on an IPR.

A recent Federal Circuit decision illustrates the dangers of construing claims too broadly when applying the “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) standard. Petitioners especially must remember that the BRI of a term must be “reasonable” in light of the specification. Relying on broad constructions that fail to account for narrowing language in the specification can lead to defeat.

As we have written previously, the PTAB is very active in defining what is and is not a printed publication, and what the PTAB decides can make or break the IPR. A recent decision illustrates yet again the pitfalls that petitioners can face when attempting to prove that a reference is a printed publication. In IPR2016-01614, the petitioner cited a drug label as a printed publication, and though it had a copyright date, the PTAB wanted to see more than just what was on the face of the label.

A recent district court decision illustrates that petitioners should think carefully about requesting IPRs of claims that they may challenge as indefinite in litigation. Indefiniteness challenges are not permitted during an IPR. However, a PTAB decision during IPR may influence a district court’s ruling on an indefiniteness challenge raised in the litigation.